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ADMINISTRATIVE ARBITRARINESS-A
REJOINDER TO PROFESSOR DAVIS'
"FINAL WORD"
RAOTIL BMGER t
My Reply to Professor Davis' Comment was framed because I
felt that 1) the Comment befogged the issues, and 2) it exhibited grave
deficiencies of scholarship on the part of an influential commentator.'
Although the pages of this Review were open to him for a detailed
refutation, he chose, not surprisingly, to stand pat--ipse dixit. His
"Final Word" 2 contains a fresh sprinkling of inaccuracies and distortions, of which a few examples must suffice. My statement that
the heavily burdened "courts increasingly look to [scholars] for
guidance" is twisted by him into my "naive notion that judges obey
when the treatise writer commands." ' He attributes to me the view
that "administrative discretion is reviewable in all areas" ' despite my
statement that a "sound exercise of discretion . . . continues to be
insulated" from review,' and my demonstration that "discretion" and
"abuse of discretion" are totally different and were treated as "opposites" by Congress.' If the attribution is inadvertent, it is yet slipshod to attribute to me a view that is poles removed from mine. Again,
Berger "does not deny that the words [of section 10] are unclear or
that the legislative history is conflicting." ' Professor Davis is wrong
on both counts. My article noted that the legislative history of section
10(a) (not of section 10(e) and the "discretion" exception) was
indeed "mixed and confusing," ' but as my Reply emphasized, "the
1 Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness-A Reply to Professor Davis, 114 U. PA.
L. REv. 783, 784, 787-88, 813 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Berger, Reply].
2 Davis, Administrative Arbitrariness-A Final Word, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 814
(1966) [hereinafter cited as Davis, Final Word].
3
Id. at 815. He also comments on "Berger's strange charge that I have misled
the courts." Nowhere did I state that he misled the courts, although he himself has
not shrunk from charging the Supreme Court with "misleading generalizations" by
which "lower courts are often misled." 1 DAVIS, ADMIlSxTRATIVE LAW TREATISE
viii (1958) [hereinafter cited as DAVIS, TREATISE]. And it is not "strange" to assert
that courts have mistakenly relied upon his faulty analysis. Berger, Reply 795 nn.
67 & 68.
4 Davis, Final Word 814 n.2. (Emphasis added.)
5 Berger, Reply 790.
6 Id. at 788-89, 794-95.
7 Davis, Final Word 815.
8 Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness and Judicial Review, 65 COLum. L. REv.
55, 84-88 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness]. See also
Berger, Reply 793.
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history of the discretion exception seems quite clear, and here it is
Professor Davis who confuses analysis by drawing on general discussions of reviewability, which at best must yield to unequivocal
statements about the particular question whether 'abuse of discretion'
was to be reviewable." ' My Reply also stated that there was not a
shred of evidence in the legislative history for his view that arbitrary
action was to be selectively unreviewable-all the evidence points the
other way.' ° So there is no conflict on this score in the legislative
history. Nor do I concede that the words of section 10 are "unclear."
My Reply stated, "if we give 'discretion' and 'abuse of discretion' the
plainly opposite meanings they had for Congress, the second exception
and section 10 (e) make both 'practical and grammatical sense .... ' " "
Professor Davis repeatedly charged in his Comment that I could
not summon a single case for my view. My Reply pointed out that
First Nat'l Bank v. First Nat'l Bank ' was such a case and was in
fact discussed in my article.' 3 Now he triumphantly asserts that this
"single case . . . turns out on appeal [First Nat'l Bank v. Saxon 1]
not only to give [me] no support but to be an outstanding authority
in favor of the position [he has] asserted." "5 His use of this case
tellingly illuminates his methods. The district court held that the
Comptroller's failure to grant an administrative hearing on the establishment of a branch bank was arbitrary. On appeal, this was reversed
on the ground that no hearing was required by the APA except when
some other statute required a hearing on the record, and such a
requirement was lacking in the Banking Act.'6
The Banking Act made establishment of a branch bank turn on
the "approval of the Comptroller." The district court stated that "If
the use of the word 'approval' is deemed to commit agency action to
agency discretion within the meaning of the second exception to § 10,
nevertheless it must be a sound discretion exercised in a manner that
is not violative of procedural due process." Such due process, said
the court, "requires at least .

.

. that the decision is not arbitrary."

Since there had been no administrative "hearing" or record the court
could not determine "whether his acts were arbitrary," which implies
that arbitrary action is reviewable.'
Thus the district court in effect
OBerger, Reply 793.

(Emphasis added.)

-1 Id. at 794.

I Id. at 789.
12 232 F. Supp. 725 (E.D.N.C. 1964).
13 Berger, Reply 794 n,64.
14 352 F.2d 267 (4th Cir. 1965).
15 Davis, Final Word 815. (Emphasis added.)
16 352 F.2d at 269-70.
17 232 F. Supp. at 729-30.
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rejected the Davis view that the "committed" phrase can shield arbitrary action from review, and it is this "opinion" with which Professor
Davis now "agrees"! 18 That "agreement," as will appear, blandly
abjures his earlier view, on which a court relied, without acknowledging the recantation.' 9 So much for the district court-the "single
case."
The Fourth Circuit said in passing that the district court "can
set aside [the Comptroller's] determination if . . . it concludes that

the Comptroller has abused, exceeded or arbitrarily applied his discretion." 20 And it added that
Abundant authority, with which we agree, holds that the
Comptroller's determination in the present area is not immunized from review by the exemption in the preface of
§ 1009 [APA § 10] . . . [for] agency discretion. Any
discretion vested in the Comptroller in passing upon applications for approval of bank branches is not the type of discretion to which action has been "committed by law" but
is rather one of the character expressly made reviewable by
Section 1009(e) (1). 4 Davis, Administrative Law Treatise,
§ 28.16.21
Professor Davis relies on the last sentence to show that the Fourth
Circuit "specifically adopt [ed] [his] analysis." ' Were I a stickler
for the distinction between "dictum" and "holding," on which Professor Davis laid much stress in his Comment,2 3 I would point out
that if there was no duty to hold a hearing there was no occasion to
inquire whether it was arbitrarily denied, so that the court's remarks
about what "type of discretion" is reviewable were the purest dictum.
Instead, I cheerfully concede that the court unnecessarily assumed
without discussion that the "committed" phrase authorizes courts to
determine whether arbitrariness is reviewable or not. The Fourth
Circuit does not tell us why the "committed" phrase cuts off the
review which section 10(e) directs, for the very good reason that no
decision on the issue was called for. It does not advert to the due
process ground taken by the court below-which cannot be dismissed
18 He considers that "the district court case is a sound and orthodox holding that
approval by the Comptroller of the Currency of establishment of a branch bank is
judicially reviewable. I agree with both the decision and with the opinion." Davis,
Final Word 814.
19 For a discussion of the Gidney case see Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness
75-78; pp. 819-20 infra.
20 352 F.2d at 272.
21
2 2

d. at 270.

Davis, Final Word 814.
2 See Berger, Reply 804 n.121; cf. id. at 785-86.
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out of hand-because it agreed that arbitrariness was reviewable
under the act. These are cardinal questions that call for an answer in
terms of statutory and constitutional analysis which courts have yet
to undertake, and for which still another uncritical citation of the
Davis Treatise is no substitute.
But to assume that the "committed" phrase means what Professor
Davis maintains it does is only the first step. There is still the question of how we are to determine when and whether the "committed"
phrase cuts off review of arbitrariness-a formidable problem, as
Ferry v. Udall illustrates.2 4 Of course, the Fourth Circuit furnished
no clue because the question was not presented. An attempt to make
such a determination had led a court, in Community Nat'l Bank v.
Gidney, in reliance on Professor Davis, to reject a complaint that the
Comptroller had abused his discretion in authorizing a Detroit bank
to establish a branch, and to hold that since agency action was "by
law committed to the discretion of the Comptroller, such action is not
reviewable-even for arbitrariness or abuse of discretion." 25 Gidney
was cited with approval in the Davis Treatise.6 And Gidney found
its basis for applying the Davis "committed" formula to the banking
field in the Davis Treatise itself. For Professor Davis had declared,
and was so quoted in Gidney, that
The critical process in the federal control of banking is the
supervising power, not adjudication or rule-making. The
supervising power is not and probably cannot be surrounded
by procedural safeguards in formal hearings and it is largely
immune from the checks of judicial review. Freedom from
arbitrary or unfair administrative action must depend upon
27
factors other than formal procedures or judicial review.
Presumably Gidney concluded, to borrow the Davis phrase, that
"supervising" in the banking field is "intrinsically unsuited" to review.
Now comes Saxon, in which Professor Davis heartily concurs and
holds that such "supervising" is reviewable. Perhaps Professor Davis
can explain why that which was "unsuitable" for review in the banking
field in Gidney has now become reviewable in Saxon. Since Gidney
has discreetly been dropped from the Davis Treatise," and because he
should not be charged with wilful inconsistency, one must conclude
that he has repudiated Gidney, particularly since the Gidney court
336 F.2d 706 (9th Cir. 1964) ; for discussion see Berger, Reply 799-803.
192 F. Supp. 514, 517 (E.D. Mich. 1961); for discussion see Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness75-76.
264 DAviS, TREATISE § 28.06 (Supp. 1963).
24
2Z

27192 F. Supp. at 518; 1 DAvis, TREATISE §4.04, at 251.

See Berger, Reply 794 n.64.
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itself recanted. 9 Consistency is no fetish of mine; a man who reconsiders in the light of experience at times must change his mind,
but it does him honor to say so. To withhold acknowledgment of the
change is to confuse those who vainly seek to reconcile irreconcilable
opinions.
There is yet another test, formulated in Ferry v. Udall,30 which
Professor Davis characterizes as a "well considered" case:"' action is
"committed by law to agency discretion" when the statute is "permissive," i.e., when it permits rather than commands an administrator to do something. Since the Ferry statute was "permissive,"
review of arbitrariness would not lie. The Banking Act is also "permissive," providing that the Comptroller's approval "may be given or
withheld in his discretion." " How can Professor Davis approve
Ferry, which would deny review under a "permissive" statute, and at
the same time approve Saxon, which declares that arbitrariness is
reviewable, despite the presence of a "permissive" statute?
Professor Davis finds that judicial "unanimity [?] is based on
something more than the three factors Mr. Berger discusses-statutory
language, legislative history and my Treatise. The key to the courts'
unanimity lies in their long standing and universal understanding that
some administrative discretion is intrinsically unsuited to judicial
review." '3 Whatever the courts' alleged unanimity is based on, it is
crystal clear that it is not based upon an analysis of either the "statutory language" or its "legislative history." No court has as yet
undertaken to analyae either. As to their "universal understanding
that some administrative discretion [sic] is intrinsically unsuited to
judicial review," it is a startling proposition, to which no amount
of undocumented repetition by Professor Davis can accustom me, that
constitutional protection against official oppression is "unsuited" to
any corner of American life. 4 Selective shelter for arbitrariness is at
war with the Supreme Court's statement that "there is no place in
our constitutional system for the exercise of arbitrary power," my
"passionate belief" in which Professor Davis now professes to
"share." " Who but the courts insure that it finds no place in our
constitutional system; and how can he "share" my belief and still
maintain that "courts should not undertake to cure all arbitrariness in
government" ?

6

29Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness 75-76 n.109.

30 336 F.2d 706 (9th Cir. 1964).

314 DAvis, TREATISE § 28.16, at 20 (Supp. 1965).

82 Quoted in First Nat'l Bank v. Saxon, 352 F.2d 267, 270 (4th Cir. 1965).
33 Davis, Final Word 815.

34 See Berger, Reply 813.
35 Davis, Final Word 815.
36 Ibid.

(Emphasis added.)
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But if he can reconcile the irreconcilable, and "intrinsic unsuitability" is indeed the test, then we need to be told by him whether or
not a "permissive" function is unsuited for review, whether or not
"supervision" of a banking function-for example, establishment of a
branch bank with official approval-is or is not "unsuited" for
judicial review, and in both cases why they are suited or unsuited for
judicial review. To play both sides of the street merely compounds
confusion. Professor Davis did not hesitate to reprove the Supreme
Court for issuing "holdings both ways" when it "should either have
followed the 1947 case or it should have written an opinion overruling
it. The Court seemed to act without any regard for the needs of law
development." 'T Physician cure thyself.
If my analysis of the statute, of its history and of constitutional
imperatives be proven faulty, and we are to accept selective unreviewability, the test recently employed by the Second Circuit in Cappadora
v. Celebrezze s is vastly to be preferred to Davis' "intrinsically unsuited" standard. There Judge Friendly said:
We do not believe that Congress would have wished to close
the doors of the courts to a plaintiff whose claim for social
security benefits was denied . . .because of a truly arbitrary
administrative decision . . . . Absent any evidence to the

contrary, Congress may rather be presumed to have intended
that the courts should fulfill their traditional role of defining
and maintaining the proper bounds of administrative discretion and safeguarding the rights of the individual."
In other words, there is a presumption that arbitrariness is reviewable
unless there is "evidence to the contrary" that Congress "wished to
close the door." o
Professor Davis puts the shoe on the other foot: "nothing but the
clearest and strongest congressional intent could induce the court to
undertake tasks which the judges deem inappropriate for judicial
action." 41 If there be judges who feel that official arbitrariness should
be sheltered, the section 10(e) mandate that courts "shall set aside"
arbitrary action, the legislative history which exhibits an unmistakeable
intention to make all arbitrary action reviewable-"in any case"-and
37 1 DAvis, TR ATISE vi, ix.
38

No. 29647, 2d Cir., Jan. 28, 1966.
39 Id.at S.O. 846. In a subsequent opinion, Wong Wing Hang v. Immigration
& Naturalization Service, No. 29335, 2d Cir., Mar. 28, 1966, Judge Friendly, seeking
to resolve the "conflict!' betveen the preamble of § 10 and § 10(e), states that "only
in the rare-some say non-existent--case" of a "discretion that 'is not subject to the
restraint of the obligation of reasoned decision' . . . may review for 'abuse' be precluded." Id. at S.O. 1331-32.
40 See also Berger, Reply 805-06.
41 Davis, Finl Word 815.
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frequent Supreme Court pronouncements such as the 1965 statement
that "the delegated power, of course, may not be exercised arbitrarily," ' should lead them upon checking my analysis to conclude
that arbitrariness was meant to be and should be reviewable across
the board.
Professor Davis' use of cases, I submit, demonstrates that he is
more interested in laying Berger low than in furthering a fruitful and
coherent analysis, the "needs of law development" which he chided the
Supreme Court for disregarding.43 It is of no importance whether he
or I scored a point in a debate; but it is of great importance that the
growth of the law be uncluttered by faulty and confused analysis.
42 FCC v. Schreiber, 381 U.S. 279, 292 (1965).
43 See text accompanying note 37 supra.

